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) 
[Sac. No. 6654. In ~~nk. Mar. 7,1958.} 
COUNTY OF ALPINE, AJipellant, v. COUNTY OF 
TUOLUMNE et aI., RespoJldents. 
[1] Counties - Boundaries - Dct.ermination - B1 Surve1.-Gov. 
Code, 55 23171-23175, relatm, to lettlement of county boundary 
disputes, provides a special remedy for the determination by 
survey, by the State LuC.t Commission, of inadequately 
marked boundary lines; mtl. IUney, when properly made and 
finally approved, is conclusiTt 6f the subject lines and corners. 
(Gov. Code, 528175.) 
[2] Id. - Boundaries - DetenIIiI.aaIon-B1 Survey: B1 Oourts.-
The language of Gov. code;ti 23171-28175, relates to the "de-
termination" of disputed boctiary lines only through the mak-
ing of surveys to mark tht «nunty boundary lines defined by 
Gov. Code, tit. 3, di\". 1, day. 2, art. 2 (§§ 28100-23158), not 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, CountieE., H 10, ll; Am.Jur., Counties, 5§ 8, 
14,15. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] C.~llLt;es, § 19; [2,3] Counties, 5519, 
20; [4-6] Counties, § 20; [7,9,::: Counties, 517; [8] Administra-
tive Law, § 2; [10] Administr&':..~ Law, 513. 
.':D . 
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to define those lines by interpreting legislative language which 
leaves uncertain the point where the survey shall start or the 
courses it must follow; with respect to disputes of the latter 
character, the legislative plan contemplates resolution by 
judicial proceedings. (Gov. Code, §§ 23178, 51000-51009.) 
(8] ld. - Boundaries - Determination-By Survey: By Oourts.-
Two procedures for determining county boundary lines are 
provided in the Government Code, but the two methods are not 
necessarily alternative in a given case; rather, §§ 51000-51099, 
providing for judicial determination, may be invoked where 
the language of the boundary statute is unclear as well as 
where the line has been obliterated, while §§ 23171-23175, pro-
viding for a survey by the State Lands Commission when the 
common boundary is "not adequately marked by natural 
objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made," are to be availed 
of only where the language of the boundary statute is clear 
and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in 
adequately marking the line is required. 
[i] .ld.-Boundaries-Determination-By Courts.-Where the lan· 
guage used by the Legislature with respect to county bound-
aries is "indefinite or uncertain," construction of such language 
is exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundariss 
is a question of fact to be judicially determined. 
[6] Id.-Boundaries-Determination-By Courts.-While the fix· 
ing and defining of county boundaries is a legislative function, 
the interpretation of a statute so fixing such boundaries is a 
judicial function, to be exercised by the courts. 
[6] ld.-Boundaries-Determination-By Oourts.-In an action by 
Alpine County against three other counties to determine bound-
aries, where the evidence disclosed that there were four 
possible locations of the "Sonora trail," that the location of 
the "West Point road" was similarly uncertain, and that the 
uncertainty as to the true location of these points was the 
cause of boundary disputes, which of the several possible 
locations of markers was intended by the Legislature to de-
lineate the boundaries of Alpine County was a fact question to 
be determined by the courts; the State Lands Commission wail 
not empowered to settle the boundary disputes. 
[7&,7b] ld.-Boundaries-Powers of State Lands Oommission.-
The States Lands Commission is not empowered to determine 
whether a boundary line has been fixed because of mutual use 
and recognition within the meaning of Gov. Code, § 23170 or 
§ 23177; the sole power conferred on it with respect to bound-
ary lines is "to survey and mark" them, and this does not 
include the power to make a prior determination that the 
statutory line has been altered by mutual use and recognition. 
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[8] Administrative Law-Agencies-Powers.-An administrative 
agency can act only as to those matters which are within the 
scope of the powers delegated to it. 
[9] Oounties-Boundaries-Mutual Recognition.-The mutual rec-
ognition statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 23170, 23177) represent a codi-
fication of the common-law doctrine of acquiescence, and that 
doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line whel'e 
the true location is uncertain; where the location of a bound-
ary Ilne is in dispute because of uncertainty or indefiniteness 
in the statutory description, primary jurisdiction over the dis-
pute is in the courts rather than the State Lands Commission. 
[10] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Exhaustion of Ad· 
ministrative Remedies.-The rules that where an administra-
tive remedy is provided by statute relief must be sought before 
the administrative body and such remedy exhausted before the 
courts will act, and that it lies within the power of an admin-
istrative agency to determine in the first instance and before 
judicial relief may be granted whether a given controversy 
where the agency is given no jurisdiction to make a judicial 
falls within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, are inapplicable 
determination of the type involved. 
[11] Oounties-Boundaries-Powers of State Lands Oommission: 
Estoppel.-A county's erroneous request to the State Lands 
Commission to determine disputed boundaries between counties 
could not invest the commission with jurisdiction beyond that 
conferred on it by law or estop the county from pursuing its 
proper remedy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stan-
islaus County. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action by one county against other counties for judicial 
determination of boundary between it and defendant counties. 
Judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to order sustaining 
demurrer to amended complaint without leave to amend, 
reversed with directions. 
Ward H. Coffill and Jeremy C. Cook for Appellant. 
[8] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 16. 
[10) See Oa1.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 184 et seq. i Am.Jur., 
Public Administrative Law, § 197 et seq. 
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James H. Phillips as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Ross A. Carkeet, Special Counsel (Tuolumne), Hardin & 
Gorgas, James R. Hardin, Joseph S. Huberty, District Attor-
ney (Calaveras), and Anthony A. Caminetti, Jr., District 
Attorney (Amador), for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff Alpine County appeals from a 
judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to an order sustaining 
defendant counties' demurrers to the amended complaint with-
out leave to amend. By its complaint Alpine seeks a judicial 
determination of the boundary between it and defendant coun-
ties, and to restrain those counties from exercising jurisdiction 
over certain territory alleged to he situated within the bound-
aries of Alpine. Each of the defendants demurred on the 
grounds that the complaint does not state a cause of action, 
that the court has no jurisdiction of the persons of the defend-
ants or of the subject of the action, and that there is another 
action pending between the parties for the same causes alleged 
in the complaint. We have concluded that the complaint 
states a cause of action for judicial interpretation of an unclear 
boundary line statute, that the court has jurisdiction over 
the matter, that the complaint does not show that any other 
action is pending between the parties on a similar cause, and 
that the judgment of dismissal should therefore be reversed. 
The boundaries of Alpine County are defined in section 
23102 of the Government Code as follows: "Beginning at 
the north corner, at a point where the state line crosses 
the east summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains ... ; thence 
southwesterly along said summit to a point two miles west 
of James Green's house, in Hope Valley, called Thompson's 
Peak; thence southwesterly in a direct line to a point on the 
Amador and Nevada turnpike road in front of Z. Kirkwood's 
house ... ; thence south across the north fork of the Mokelumne 
River to the road leading from West Point, in Calaveras, to 
Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows; thence easterly along 
said West Point road to the Big Tree road; thence easterly 
in a direct line to where the Sonora trail strikes the middle 
fork of the Stanislaus River; thence easterly along said trail 
to the summit of the Sierra Nevada Mountains; thence north-
erly along said summit of the dividing ridge between the 
West Walker and Carson Rivers; thence northeasterly along 
said dividing ridge to the state line •.. ; thence northwest 
along said state line to the place of beginning." 
) 
.) 
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By resolutions dated June 16, 1950, and July 21, 1950, the 
Board of Supervisors· of Alpine County petitioned the State 
Lands Commission to investigate and survey the problem of 
a disputed boundary common to Alpine and Tuolumne Coun-
ties, and by resolution dated July 6, 1953, the same board 
made the same request with respect to Alpine's common 
boundaries with Amador and Calaveras Counties. The only 
source of authority of the State Lands Commission to aet in 
a matter of this type is section 23171 of the Government Code 
read together with section 6204 of the Public Resources Code. 
Section 23171 provides that" All common boundaries and 
common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural 
objects or lines, or by surveys lawfully made, shall be defi-
nitely established by surveys made jointly by the $Urveyors 
of all the counties affected, and approved by the boards of 
supervisors of the counties, or by a survey made by the State 
Lands Commission, on application of the board of supervisors 
of any county affected." Section 6204 of the Public Resources 
Code states that "The [state lands] commission shall when 
required, survey and mark the boundary lines of counties 
and cities." 
According to the subject pleading, the dispute as to the 
boundaries here involved arose from two sources: (1) uncer-
tainty as to the terminal point of the line running south from 
Z. Kirkwood's house "to the road leading from West Point, 
in Calaveras, to Big Tree road, near the Big Meadows"; and 
(2) uncertainty as to the location of "the Sonora trail," as 
those terms are used in the statutory boundary description of 
Alpine. 
Pursuant to the above mentioned requests of Alpine's Board 
of Supervisors, the State Lands Commission undertook investi-
gations and conducted hearings in an effort to determine the 
true boundary line. Subsequently, certain findings adverse 
to the position of Alpine were approved by the commission. 
Alpine then instituted the present action, and the commission 
suspended its proceedingS pending the outcome of this liti-
gation. -
In its complaint Alpine alleges that "there is, and for many 
years last past has b~en, dispute and disagreement and uncer-
tainty existing between" Alpine and Amador, Calaveras, and 
Tuolumne Counties due to the above mentioned uncertainties 
in statutory boundary descriptions; that the exact location of 
the boundary lines in question "is in dispute and has never 
been actually or judicially determined" ; that no survey mark-
) 
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ing the lines at the disputed points "can be made until the 
[uncertainties in location are] judicially determined"; that 
defendant counties have been encroaching in certain specified 
respects on the jurisdiction of Alpine County, over the protest 
of Alpine, on certain portions of Alpine lying to the east 
and north of the true boundary line; and that Alpine "has 
no adequate remedy at law or by administrative process." 
Alpine prays for a judicial determination of the western and 
southern boundary lines of the county, and for a decree en-
joining defendant counties from asserting jurisdiction over 
the land areas lying east and north of the court-determined 
line and from receiving or using funds from the United States 
Forest Service based on acreage of national forest lands within 
the disputed areas. As noted earlier, demurrers of Amador, 
Calaveras, and Tuolumne Counties to tRis complaint were 
sustained without leave to amend, and Alpine appeals from 
the judgment of dismissal thereafter entered. 
The crucial question presented is whether the courts have 
any jurisdiction over the controversy in its present state, 
or whether Alpine is precluded from judicial relief until the 
administrative agency (the State Lands Commission) has 
finally determined the issues tendered to it. We have con-
cluded, for reasons hereinafter stated, that primary juris-
diction in this case rests in the courts, and that the courts 
are not required to delay their proceedings until the commis-
sion has concluded its hearings. 
Defendant counties contend that under the above quoted 
provisions of section 23171 of the Government Code and section 
6204 of the Public Resources Code, the State Lands Com-
mission is granted the power to settle boundary disputes by 
surveying and marking the true boundary line, and therefore 
Alpine cannot seek judicial relief until the administrative pro-
ceedings requested by Alpine are concluded. [1] It is true 
that in sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code the law 
provides a special remedy for the determination by survey of 
inadequately marked boundary lines. Such a survey, when 
properly made and finally approved, is conclusive of the sub-
ject lines and corners. (Gov. Code, § 23175; People v. Boggs 
(1880),56 Cal. 648.) 
However, it is to he noted that sections 23171-23175 are 
located in Government Code, title 3, division 1, dealing with 
H Counties Generally." Article 2 of chapter 2 of that division 
defines the boundaries of the several counties and is followed 
by article 3 which relates to "Settlement of Boundary Dis-
) 
.J 
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putes." Section 23171 is found in article 8 and, as herein-
above mentioned, provides that U All common boundaries and 
common corners of counties not adequately marked by natural 
objects or lines • • . shall be definitely established by surveys 
..• " and section 23173, also in article 3, declares that "Upon 
the reports made by the county surveyors the State Lands 
Commission shall finally determine and establish the common 
boundaries and corners, if it can collate a satisfactory descrip-
tion therefrom. If the reports are insufficient for the purpose, 
it shall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it, 
the surveys establish the (!ommon boundaries and corners." 
[2] It is manifest that the language of the sections above 
quoted relates to the "determination" of disputed boundary 
lines only through the making of surveys to mark tke bounda,." 
lines defined by tke Legislature in article 2, not to define those 
lines by interpreting legislative language which leaves uncer-
tain the point where the survey shall start or the courses it 
must follow. 
In respect to disputes of the latter character (i.e., those 
which involve not merely running a survey to mark legally 
defined lines but, rather, conducting a proceeding to legally 
define the lines so that thereafter they can be marked on 
making a survey) it is clear from the language above quoted, 
read in the context of related provisions, that the legislative 
plan contemplates resolution by judicial proceedings. In this 
connection, it is noted that section 23178 of article 3 provides 
that "Whenever a common boundary ••. has been legally 
established in accordance with Article 3 of this chapter, or by 
judicial proceedings," etc. Furthermore, we find that in title 
5, division 1, chapter 5, of the same code, dealing specifically 
with "Boundaries" and proceedings to establish them, section 
51000 provides that "When the location of a boundary line 
of a local agency(1] is indefinite or uncertain, or the boundary 
line has been obliterated from any cause, it may be determined, 
defined, and established pursuant to this chapter." Section 
51001 declares that "The . legislative body of the local agency 
having an indefinite, uncertain, or obliterated boundary may 
cause a proceeding to be brought in the name of the local 
agency to have the boundary line determined, defined, and 
established. " In the proceeding thus instituted, "The [supe-
rior] court shall determine the location of the boundary line 
'The term "local .geuey" .. used in the subjeet portion of the code 
refill W "county. eity. or city and count1" (GOT. Oode, 6 50001). 
) 
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by courses and ·distances or by giving such other definite 
description as is necessary or desirable." (Gov. Code, § 51007.) 
After the court has determined the boundary line, a copy of 
its judgment is filed with the Secretary of State (Gov. Code, 
§ 51008), and "From the date of filing, the boundary line is 
established and fixed for all purposes and constitutes the true 
and official boundary line of the local agency" (Gov. Code, 
§ 51009). Sections 51000-51009 of the Government Code were 
derived from a statute first enacted in 1921 (Stats. 1921, chap. 
838, p. 1607) which contained almost identical language. In 
City of Crescent Oity v. Dodd (1933), 131 CalApp. 153 [21 
P.2d 1401, it was held that this latter statute "furnishes a 
full and complete remedy to cities [and counties], and by its 
provisions allows a full and complete investigation as to indefi-
nite or uncertain boundaries; allows the introduction of testi-
mony and maps, and gives a direct method of determining 
the true boundaries of cities, towns and counties," and under 
such circUInstances .. a complete remedy is afforded" in the 
courts . 
. [3] Two procedures for determining boundary lines are 
thus provided in the Government Code. However, while 
section 23171 provides that the State Lands Commission may 
make a survey, on request, when a common boundary is "not 
adequately marked by natural objects or lines, or by surveys 
lawfully made, " section 51000 provides for a judicial determi-
nation when the boundary is "indefinite or uncertain, or .•. 
obliterated. " It thus appears that the legislative plan con-
templates that the two methods are not necessarily alternative 
in a given ease; rather, that the provisions of sections 51000-
51009 may be invoked where the language of the boundary , 
statute is unclear as well as where the line has been obliterated, 
while the remedy provided by sections 23171-23175 is to be 
availed of only where the language of the boundary statute 
is clear and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor 
in adequately marking the line is required. [4] In other 
words, where the language used by the Legislature is "indefi-
nite or uncertain," construction of such language is a matter . 
exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundaries 
is a question of fact to be judicially determined. (County of . 
Sierra v. County 'of Nevada (1908), 155 Cal. 1, 18 [99 P. 
371].) [6] The foregoing construction is in accord with: 
the generally recognized rule that while the fixing and defining : 
of county boundaries is a legislative function, the interpreta· . 
tion of a statute so fixing such boundaries is a judicial func-
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tion, to be exercised by the courts. (Roy O. Martin Lumber 
Co. v. Baird (1954),225 La. 14 [71 So.2d 865, 868] i Ballard v. 
w. 2'. Smith Lumber Co. (1953),258 Ala. 436 [63 So.2d 376, 
378 [3]] i 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 261, § 7.05.) 
In the case of County of Sierra v. County of Nevada (1908), 
fttpra, 155 Cal. 1, there was a dispute as to the boundary line 
between Sierra and Nevada Counties. The boundary statute 
there involved provided in pertinent part that the line ran 
"west to the source of and down the South Fork and Middle 
Yuba River." The dispute related to the location of the 
"source of the South Fork." (P. 4 of 155 Oal.) No official 
survey of the boundary between the two litigating counties 
had ever been made. The trial court determined the location 
in question and this court affirmed the judgment as based upon 
substantial evidence. 
It was eontended in the Sierra ease that under the pro-
visions of sections 3969-3972 of the Political Code (now Gov. 
Code, §§ 23171-23173,23175) a mode was Hfixed by the legis-
lature whereby the boundaries of counties must be ascertained; 
that this legal remedy must be exhausted before the matter 
of conflicting boundaries can be presented for judicial deter-
mination in a court of equity. (People ex rei. Borrell v. 
Boggs [(1880), supra], 56 Cal. 648.)" (County of Sierra v. 
County of Nevada (1908), supra, 155 Cal. 1, 12.) The court 
in rejecting such contention held (pages 13-15): "[I]t is 
obvious that the question presented in the case at bar, and 
the matter before the court in the ease cited, call for the 
application of different principles of law. In the case cited 
the court grounded its conclusion on the fact that the statute 
defining the boundary had fixed the boundary line of the 
counties as the summit of the dividing ridge, and that the 
act which the code section directed the surveyor-general [the 
predecessor of the State Lands Commission] to do with refer-
ence to the establishment of said boundary, was simply to go 
on the ground and in his ministerial capacity run his lines 
along the ridge. Of conrse, where the legisfature has fixed a 
boundary along a ridge, a well-defined course readily deter-
minable and ascertainable, there is no action on the part of 
the surveyor-general ealled for but to run his survey line 
thereon on the ground. Where the language of an act 80 
clearly defines the line that there is nothing to be done but run 
a survey along it, there is no room for question, but the 
sections of the code relied on by appellant furnish a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy for the establishment of the 
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line, and that a court of equity cannot be called upon 
what the law in the first instance provided for having 
But this legal remedy can only be availed of where 
language of an act defining a boundary is clear. Where it 
not clear, and where the description of the boundary is 
doubtful import, or where it requires the interpretation of a 
court to ascertain what is meant by the language of the 
statute when mentioning localities, natural objects, or sources 
of streams as matters of boundary, the sections of the code 
have no application. . . • When the courts have interpreted 
the language of the act, and declared what the 
in dispute are as a matter of law, then only can surveyors or 
the surveyor-general act, and they act then in establishing the 
line on the ground solely in a ministerial capacity . • • What 
the source of the South Fork is is not definitely fixed or deter-
mined by the act, and could only be determined by judicial 
inquiry to ascertain its location. It is only upon its ascertain-
ment that the line therefrom to the state line could be run, or 
a surveyor be able to locate by survey the line called for. 
If it could be said that it was purely a ministerial act of the 
surveyor-general to ascertain from the language used in the 
act this source and make his survey accordingly, it would 
be difficult to conceive of a case where the language of an act 
could be so uncertain or indefinite as to boundaries of a 
county, or with reference to any point from which boundaries 
were to be measured, so that a court of equity could be ever 
invested with jurisdiction to construe the language of an act 
and determine as matter of law what the boundaries intended 
to be fixed by it were." 
[6] The Sierra case appears indistinguishable from the 
case at bar as to the pertinent issues involved. The record 
in this case discloses that there are four possible locations 
of the" Sonora trail," that the location of the "West Point 
road" is similarly uncertain, and that the uncertainty as to 
the true location of these points is the cause of the present 
boundary disputes. Which of the several possible locations 
of these markers was intended by the Legislature to delineate 
the boundaries of Alpine County is a fact question to be 
determined by the courts. It follows from the foregoing that 
the State Lands 'Commission is not empowered to settle the i 
boundary disputes in this case, and that Alpine's action is 
tenable. The complaint alleges the cause and nature of the 
disputes, Alpine's interpretation of the language in question, 
and the acts of defendant counties which_ are claimed to con-
) 
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artitute infringements on Alpine's rights; such eomplaint states 
a cause of action for the relief sought. 
[7a] Defendant counties further urge that one of the duties 
of the State Lands Commission is to determine whether a 
boundary line has been fixed because of mutual use and recog-
nition within the meaning of either section 231702 or section 
231778 of the Government Code, and therefore that the courts 
cannot in any event aet in this case until the commission has 
completed its determination on this matter. This argument 
also is untenable. 
To begin with, the commission is not empowered to 
determine the applicability of the mutual recognition statutes. 
[8] An administrative agency can act only as to those matters 
which are within the scope of the powers delegated to it. 
(State Compo Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942), 20 
Ca1.2d 264, 266 [2] [125 P.2d 42) (Industrial Accident Com-
mission); Wheeler V. City of Santa Ana (1947),81 Cal.App. 
2d 811, 816 [1) [185 P.2d 373) (Civil Service Commission) ; 
2 Cal.Jur.2d 30, § 16.) [7b] The powers delegated to the 
State Lands Commission deal generally with title to and usage 
of public lands, minerals and oil and gas on such lands, and 
navigable waters of the state. (Pub. Resources Code, § 6216.) 
Aside from section 6204 of the Public Resources Code (ante, 
p. 791) no reference to city or county boundary lines is made 
in the statutes establishing the commission and defining its 
powers, and no power to fix or ascertain such boundaries with! 
reference to usage and custom is expressly or impliedly con-l 
ferred. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 6101-6223; see also! 
California Administrative Code, tit. 2, div. 3, ch. 1.) The sole 
power conferred on the commission with respect to boundary 
lines is to "survey and mark" them; the power to make a 
prior determination that the statutory line has been altered 
by mutual use and recognition is neither expressly nor im-
pliedly included in the powers conferred, for such determina-
'Government Code, lection 2B170, provides as follows: 
'" Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually 
recognized and used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of 
assessment and collection of taxes for a period ot 25 years continuously 
prior to July 30, 1927, is confirmed, validated, and declared to be legally 
established.' , 
'Government Cpde, lootion 23177, provides al follows: 
"Every common boundary between counties which has been mutually 
used by the counties adjacent thereto for the purpose of the assessment 
and collection of taxes for a period ot 15 years continuously prior to the 
e1footive date of this seetion [September 22, 1951] is hereb7 confirmed, 
nlidated, and declared to be lerally established." 
) 
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tion is not a necessary part of the ministerial function 
surveying and marking. 
[9] The mutual recognition statutes represent a coa:lDc~ 
tion of the common law doctrine of acquiescence. (See 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 274-276, § 7.09; Starry 
Lake (1933), 135 Ca1.App. 677, 682 [28 P.2d 80].) 
doctrine is properly invoked in fixing a boundary line where, . 
as here, the true location of the line is uncertain. (City of· 
Alameda v. City of Oakland (1926), 198 Cal. 566, 576 [2] 
[246 P. 69].) But, as noted hereinabove, where the location 
of a boundary line is in dispute because of uncertainty or 
indefiniteness in the statutory description, primary jurisdic-
tion over the dispute is in the courts rather than the adminis-
trative agency. Since the State Lands Commission has no· 
primary jurisdiction in the case of a disputed boundary line 
where the dispute is based upon an unclear definition in a 
boundary statute, and since the applicability of sections 23170 
and 23177 of the Government Code in this case is merely a 
facet of a boundary dispute of the type mentioned, it follows 
that the commission has no power to make any initial determi-
nation of the true boundaries here involved, whether based 
on the mutual recognition statutes or otherwise. 
[10] Defendants rely on the established rules that "where 
an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must 
be sought. before the administrative body and this remedy 
exhausted before the courts will act" (Abelleira v. District 
Court of Appeal (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 292 [6] [l09 P.2d 
942, 132 A.L.R. 715]), and that "it lies within the power of 
the administrative agency to determine in the first instance, 
and before judicial relief may be obtained, whether a given . 
controversy falls within the statutory grant of jurisdiction" !. 
(United States v. Superior Court (1941), 19 Ca1.2d 189, 195 
[3] [120 P.2d 26]). But these rules are inapplicable where, 
as here, the agency is given no jurisdiction to make a jUdicial 
determination of the type involved. [11] Alpine's errone- . 
ous request to the commission to determine the disputed 
boundaries could not invest the commission with jurisdiction 
beyond that conferred on it by law or estop Alpine from 
pursuing its proper remedy. 
Once the court has determined the boundaries here involved, 
based either on a legal interpretation of the allegedly uncer-
tain language contained in section 23102 of the Government 
Code, or on the terms of the mutual recognition statutes if 
such statutes are found to be applicable, and the facts as the 
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court may find them, then the State Lands Commission may 
well have jurisdiction, if called upon, to proceed with its 
survey and to mark the true line as judicially determined. 
However, in accordance with the principles hereinabove enun-
ciated, the initial determination of the boundaries in question 
must be made by the courts, and it was error for the trial 
court to have sustained defendants' demurrers without leave 
to amend. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed and the 
cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to over-
rule the demurrers and permit the defendants to answer, if 
they be so advised, within such reasonable time as the court 
may fix. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code provide an 
administrative procedure and sections 51000-51009 of that 
code provide a judicial procedure for determining disputed 
boundaries. Plaintiff was therefore entitled in the first in-
stance to invoke one procedure or the other. (Oity of Susan-
viUe v. Lee O. Hess 00., 45 Ca1.2d 684, 689 [290 P.2d 520] ; 
Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom., 24 
Ca1.2d 669, 673 [151 P.2d 109, 155 A.L.R. 360]; see River 
Plate & Brazil Oonferences v. Pressed Steel Oar 00., 227 F.2d 
60, 64.) Since it elected to proceed before the State Lands 
Commission before this action was commenced, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the alternative remedy was not avail-
able. When "two or more tribunals in this state have con-
current jurisdiction, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction 
retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the 
action might have been initiated .... One reason for the rule 
is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise 
if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards 
at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another 
reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment 
of multiple litigation." (Scott v. Industrial Accident Oom., 
46 CaUd 76, 81-82 [293 P.2d 18].) The Scott case makes 
clear that the rule is equally applicable when one of the 
tribunals is an administrative agency. (See also Elbert v. 
Johnson, 164 F.2d 421, 423-424; Majors v. Thompson, 235 
F.2d 449, 452; United States v. Interstate Oommerce Oom., 
337 U.S. 426, 434 [69 s.Ot. 1410,93 L.Ed. 1451].) 
) 
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This rule makes good sense and should be followed in 
present case. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, the State ........ UWl.:J 
Commission held extensive hearings and it has approved 
ings that are sufficient to permit an accurate survey to be 
made. By holding that it has no jurisdiction to resolve the 
boundary dispute, the majority not only render the commis-
sion's work nugatory, but permit plaintiff to harass defendants 
by compelling them to relitigate the dispute in another pro-' 
ceeding after the tribunal first selected by plaintiff made 
findings adverse to it. The orderly administration of justice 
demands that plaintiff abide by its election. Having chosen 
the administrative remedy, it must seek judicial relief by way 
of review of the commission's decision, not by an independent, 
action. 
Government Code, section 23175, providing that" Any sur. 
vey finally approved pursuant to this article is a conclusive 
ascertainment of the lines and corners included in the sur· 
vey," does not negate the right to judicial review of the 
commission's action, for if review is available, approval of a 
survey is not final until the commission's action has been 
affirmed or the time for seeking review has elapsed. People v. 
Boggs, 56 Cal. 648, is not to the contrary, for in that case 
the survey was not attacked in a proceeding brought to review 
the agency's action, but in a collateral proceeding brought 
to recover taxes paid under protest. Moreover, Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 1094.5, now expressly provides for the. 
review of the commission's proceedings, even though it is not I 
one of the agencies enumerated in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. (Gov. Code, § 11501.) "The framers of section 
1094.5 intended it to set forth 'the procedure by which judicial 
review can be had by the writ of mandate after a formal 
adjudicatory decision by any administrative agency.' (Empha-
sis added; see Tenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council 
of California, Appendix A, p. 45.)" (Temescal Water Co. v. 
Department of Public Works, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 101 [280 P.2d 1].) 
By its terms section 1094.5 applies" for the purpose of inquir-
ing into the validity of any final administrative order or 
decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law 
8 hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be 
taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested 
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer." Com-
mission determination of the location of a disputed landmark 
or whether a boundary had been mutually recognized or used 
for 8 period sufficient to "legally establish" it ( Gov. Code, 
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§§ 23170,23177) is a quasi.judicial function and accordingly, 
in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the require. 
ment of a bearing is implied. (Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 
Cal.2d 260, 271 [246 P.2d 656J ; Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal.2d 
226, 230 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826J; La Prade v. 
Department of Water & Power, 27 Ca1.2d 47, 53 [162 P.2d 
13]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Com., 26 Cal.2d 716, 
723·725 [160 P.2d 816J ; Carroll v. California Horse Racing 
Board, 16 Ca1.2d 164, 168 [105 P.2d 110]; cf., Keeler v. 
Superior Court,46 Ca1.2d 596, 599 [297 P.2d 967) ; DiGenova 
v. State Board of Education, 45 Cal.2d 255, 259·260 [288 
P.2d 862].) Moreover, since the commission has been granted 
the power of the head of a department of theBtate under 
Government Code, sections 11180 to 11191 (Pub. Res. Code, 
§ 6103), it is fully equipped to meet the hearing requirement. 
Its powers include the power to make investigations concern· 
ing all matters relating to the subjects under its jurisdiction; 
to inspect books and records; to hear complaints; to administer 
oaths; to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and 
testimony in any inquiry, investigation, hearing or proceeding 
pertinent or material thereto in any part of the state; to dele· 
gate its investigative and hearing powers to an officer of the 
commission; to petition the superior court in the county in 
which the hearing is pending for an order compelling witnesses 
to attend and testify or produce the papers required; and to 
cause the depositions of persons residing within or without 
the state to be taken by petitioning the superior court of Sac. 
ramento County. Any party to a commission hearing has 
the right to the attendance of witnesses in his behalf at the 
hearing or upon deposition. Such provisions are adequate 
to enable the commission to proceed and they demonstrate that 
it has the power sought to be exercised here. 
The majority hold, however, that the administrative remedy 
"provided by sections 28171·23175 is to be availed of only 
where the language of the boundary statute is clear and 
only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in ade· 
quately marking the line is required. In other words, where 
the language used by the Legislature is 'indefinite or uncer-
tain,' construction of 'such language is a matter exclusively 
for the courts, and the location of the boundaries is a question 
of fact to be judicially determined." Such a limitation on 
the commission's power is unworkable, productive of waste, 
and casts a cloud on the validity of all of its detenninations. 
.C,Jel __ 
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Whether the language of the statute is indefinite or uncertain 
may appear only after it is sought to be correlated with 
objects on the ground. Apparent clarity may disappear only 
in the light of extensive surveys undertaken by the commis-
sion that will then go for nought, and disputants will bE' 
enabled to relitigate settled bouudaries, not because they werE' 
erroneously determined. but only because ambiguity in thE' 
statutory language can be demonstrated. The applicable 
statutes themselves refute any such limitation on the commis-
sion's powers. 
There is no occasion to invoke sections 23171 to 23175 unless 
there is a dispute as to the location of the landmarks and 
lines establishing boundaries. Not only are those sections 
included in the article of the Government Code entitled ., Set-
tlement of Boundary Disputes" (tit. 3, div. 1, ch. 2, art. 3) 
but their very purpose is the settlement of such disputes. If 
there is any need to have a boundary Hdefinitely established" 
it can arise only because of doubt as to its location, either 
because, in the language of section 23171, U all common bound-
aries and common corners" are U not adequately marked by 
natural objects or lines" or because such boundaries and 
corners are not adequately marked by U surveys lawfully 
made. " It is only because of uncertainty as to the adequacy 
of the markings of common boundaries and corners or the 
legality of previous surveys that boards of supervisors of 
the counties affected are authorized to apply to the commission 
and the commission is given jurisdiction definitely to establish 
such U common boundaries" and U common corners." Section 
23172 explicitly provides for reports by county surveyors "to 
the State Lands Commission, with surveys, maps, notes, and 
explanations touching disputed points." (Italics added.) If 
these reports are insufficient to enable the commission to 
collate a satisfactory description therefrom, the commission 
Hshall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it, 
the surveys establish the common boundaries and corners." 
(Gov. Code, § 23173.) There would be no purpose in report. 
ing to the commission about" disputed points" with U surveys, 
maps, notes, and explanations" if the commission did not 
have power to settle the "disputed points." The commission's 
jurisdiction to establish by surveys common boundaries and 
corners necessarily includes jurisdiction to determine in the 
1irst instance ~he meaning of the statutory language defining 
the boundary or the existence of facts bringing into play the 
mutual recognition and use statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 23170, 
) 
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23177), for only after it has decided such preliminary ques-
tions, can a final survey be undertaken. "A public officer 
or board has not only the powers expressly enumerated by law, 
but also those implied powers which are necessary to thE' 
exercise of the powers expressly granted." (Crawford v. 
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 334 [253 P. 726].) 
The majority concede that if the language of the boundary 
statute were clear, the commission could act upon it to estab-
lish a boundary by survey. The power to do so is just as 
essential to the commission's function when the language is 
unclear, and nothing in the statutes justifies the distinction 
that the majority make. It is ironic that the commission is 
denied authority to act in the very situations in which the 
disputes it is empowered to settle are most likely to arise. 
Language in County of Sierra v. County of Nevada, 155 Ca1. 
1 [99 P. 371], unquestionably supports the position taken by 
the majority herein. In that case, however, the court was 
reviewing a judgment that had determined a disputed bound-
ary after a full trial in the trial court. The plaintiff had not 
invoked the administrative remedy but after an adverse judg-
ment sought to switch to another tribunal. It may reasonably 
be assumed that the court was reluctant to reverse a judgment 
entered after a full and accurate determination of the issues 
solely because another remedy had not been invoked. In any 
event, to sustain its decision it was only necessary for the 
court to hold that the administrative remedy was not exclusive. 
It was not necessary to hold that the administrative remedy 
did not exist. The precise problem there presented is now 
governed by statutes allowing the plaintiff an election of 
remedies in the first instance (Gov. Code, §§ 51000-51009), 
so it is unnecessary to determine whether the court erred in 
the Sierra ease in holding in effect that the administrative 
remedy was not exclusive. Obviously, however, the language 
in that decision indicating that the Legislature could not 
constitutionally invest .the State Lands Commission with 
authority in the first instance to determine the questions in-
volved in this case should be disapproved. The power to find 
facts upon which the application of a statute depends is an 
essential part of administrative authority. In 1917 this court 
said, "from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has 
become increasingly imperative that many quasi-legislative 
and quasi-judicial functions, which in smaller communities 
and under more primitive conditions were performed directly 
by the legislative or judicial branches of the government, are 
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intrusted to departments, boards, commissions, and -llgieu. 
No sound objection can longer be successfully advanced to 
growing method of transacting public business. These things 
must be done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and 
their doing, in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the 
republic, and is thus sanctioned by the highest law. For, as 
the supreme court of the United States declares: 'Indeed, it 
is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right, 
under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine 
some fact or the state of things upon which the enforcement of 
its enactment depends, would be "to stop the wheels 
government" and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in 
the conduct of the public business.'" (Gaylord v. Oity of 
PastJdena, 175 Cal. 433, 436-437 [166 P. 348].) 
More recent decisions of this court resting on the premise 
that "judicial functions" cannot constitutionally be given to 
a state-wide agency have at most given a broad scope to 
judicial review of agency action. (StM&aard Oil 00. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119] ; Whitten v. 
California State Board of Optometry, 8 Cal.2d 444 [65 P.2d 
1296, 115 A.L.R. 11; Drummey v. State Board of Funeral 
Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848] ; Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. 
California EmpZoyment Oom., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935]; 
Laisne v. Oalifornia State Board of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831 
[123 P.2d 457]; Dare v. Board of Medical Ezaminerl, 21 Cal. 
2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Sipper v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138 [137 
P.2d 425]; Moran v. Board of Medical Ezaminers, 32 Cal.2d 
301 [196 P.2d 20].) They have not gone so far as to deny: 
any administrative agency the power in the 1irst instance to i 
pass upon questions of law or fact. Oertainly, 1b:ing the 
location of a disputed landmark or determining whether a· 
boundary line has been mutually recognized for a sufficient 
time legally to establish it is no more an exclusive function 
of courts than determining the extent of the penalty for vio-
lation of the Insurance Code (Nardoni v. McOonneZl, 48 Cal. 
2d 500, 507 [310 P.2d 644]) or determining whether there is 
unappropriated water available for an applicant (TemescaZ 
Water 00. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 
106 [280 P.2d 1]), to cite but two recent instances in which 
this court has upheld the exercise of quasi-judicial power by 
a state-wide administrative agency. (See also dissenting 
opinion in Laisne v. Califorllia State Board of Optometry, 19 
Oal.2d 831,859-862 [123 P.2d 457] and cases cited.) Clearly 
/) 
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the reasons given for the decision in the Sierra ease were 
aberrational, and they should not be given fresh currency now 
merely because this is another boundary dispute case. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
